Pubs and restaurants in Germa

Whatever they may be, your expectations will be exceeded. Even the most imaginative mind finds it difficult to picture what the pubs, restaurants, monastery tap-rooms and wine taverns are like in this country. Cosy-Gemütlich, fascinating, always different. We are thinking of the many recommended establishments with their own and local specialities as well as international cuisine.

They are contemporary or even very modern – like those on the motorways. Or they are traditional or even historic, wellpreserved from the middle ages or hidden below thatched roofs – like those in the Altes Land near Hamburg. They are hidden away in narrow lanes – like many students' pubs in Heidelberg, historic hotels behind timber-framed walls – like in the Black Forest resort of Herrenalb –

between vineyards and win along the German Wine Ro There are also the old co of Northern Germany and t unique beer gardens of Up Bavaria. As we said before the most imaginative mind Perhaps you should visit Ge solely to visit its pubs and restaurants ....

'Outdoor eating in the Alte Land, near Hamburg



Dammer Berge autobahn restaurant, between Bremen and Osnabrück

DZT DEUTSCHE ZE FÜR TOURIS Beethovenstrasse 69, D-6000 F

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A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PRESS

Honecker sets scene for an icy winter

he telephone linking Helmut Schmidt and East Germany's Erich necker has gone dead.

ven without communicating, they e that there is an icy winter ahead nd not only in German-German re ns.

s has frequently happened in the , the Soviet Union is again using the R to signal a change in climate.

his is the actual reason behind the stic increase of the compulsory tschemark exchange for West Germans elling to East Germany and East lin. And as if this were not enough, rr Honecker coupled this latest meas with massive demands for a recogni by West Germany of East German zenship and for an upvaluation of the ent mutual representative offices by ing them embassies.

he East German leader knows very that the stream of visitors from the West is no threat to his regime. As annoying and detrimental to his efforts at bringing about a socialist society as such communication might be, the old age pensioners and children who have been charged a higher admittance fee since 13 October are certainly not counter-revolutionaries.

Honecker is also enough of a realist not to fall for the illusion that West Germany could change the legal basis of the special relations governing the two German states.

Instead, it seems that Honecker unenthusiastically — though fully realising the necessity — took on the job of announcing that the Kremlin masters considered it no longer appropriate after their invasion of Afghanistan to exclude central Europe from the confrontation with Washington and to pretend that they regard it as an "island of détente" to test and, if possible, weaken the solidarity of Nato.

The about-face was abrupt: only a short while ago, when Chancellor Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genscher visited Moscow, they were given to understand that the Kremlin bosses viewed them as mediators between the two superpowers.

And Erich Honecker wanted to crown the Chancellor's visit to East Germany (which failed to materialise) with a game of *skat* (Germany's favourite card game).

In fact, the intention was to demonstrate cordial agreement between the two German states.

But suddenly all ties were cut. The East spoke of the Federal Republic of Germany's aggressive interference in East Germany's domestic affairs, and the East German media were promptly buttressed by *Pravda*.

All this became necessary due to the Polish events. The ultimate question of power has come to the fore once more.

Poland's free trade unions headed by Lech Walesa are no longer seen by Moscow and East Berlin as an understandable reaction to the disregard for workers' interests but as a political party that denies the communist leadership monopoly.

There are ample indications that Moscow has already decided what is to be done in Poland to restore the tutelage of the Communist Party there and of Soviet hegemony in general.

Seen in this light, Honecker's offen-

Continued on page 4

Bonn suspends cash talks

onn has decided to suspend negotiations on an interest-free line of edit to East Germany.

About DM650m is involved. The edit was to have been for intra-German trade.

Negotiations with the East on major ergy and transportation projects have been shelved by Bonn.

These moves must be viewed as a ly to East Germany's border moves.

Bonn has no suitable lever with which force East Berlin to rescind the doub of the entrance fee to East Germa To make use of the economic lever in ore spectacular way would not only m the people in the other Germany would also remain ineffectual as s as more important political motives rn the East Bloc's actions.

The decision of the Bonn cabinet es an indication of the government's essment of the interplay between the DR measure, developments in Poland the Soviet role behind the scenes.


It indicates that Bonn is not prepared present to talk about new credits for GDR. Government spokesman aus Bölling spoke of "for the time ing", leaving it wide open to interpre ion what he meant.

But it seems obvious that Bonn is de mined not to be cornered by arbitrary DR measures — a position from which ould prove hard to extricate itself.

The government's reaction has met h cautious comments from the op ition and the offer of cooperation.

This shows that the evaluation of the ion by the CDU/CSU opposition ers little from that of the govern t and that — or so it would seem — appears to be a change in the op tion's style. *Hans Jörg Sottorf*

(Handelsblatt, 17 October 1980)



'I'm just building up the spirit of detente'.
(Cartoon: Behrendt/Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung)

East Berlin hides behind impossible demands

Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger

Erich Honecker's speech at a party meeting in Gera answered why East Germany decided to milk visitors from the West by drastically increasing the compulsory exchange of deutschemarks.

The East German leader accused Bonn of interference in the domestic affairs of the GDR and of Poland.

He put forward two demands which he knew very well no Bonn government could possibly meet.

This, together with the increase of the compulsory currency exchange, makes it obvious that East Berlin wants to stiffen the front and make the borders more impenetrable.

Of course, Honecker's demands are not new. They results from the self assessment of the Eat Berlin regime: the GDR denies that there is such a thing as the unity of the German nation.

It differentiates between the capitalist state in the West and the socialist in the East.

As a result, East Berlin demands the recognition of its citizenship and the conversion of the permanent missions in the two countries into *fully fledged* embassies.

But Bonn governments must act in accordance with the West German Constitution which stipulates that German citizenship is indivisible.

Any Bonn government would also be in breach of the Constitution if it established an embassy in East Berlin.

This would mean a departure from the special relations governing the two German states which are not international but essentially intra-German.

Though the GDR has never recognised the special nature of these relations, it has accepted Bonn's reservations in that sector. In fact, these reservations — and the GDR is well aware of this — provide the very foundation for the network of German-German treaties. As a result, Honecker's demands place all these agreements in jeopardy.

How dangerously far the GDR has gone is evidenced by a comparison of Honecker's present speech and his statement not too long ago when — amazingly independent — he strayed from Moscow's conflict course after the invasion of Afghanistan to pursue German-German cooperation, speaking of "opening up new horizons of cooperation."

That was only two months ago. What has changed since? There is much to indicate that the Bonn government is right in its assumption that the events in Poland have been so disquieting for East Berlin that it wants to seek salvation by sealing itself off.

Regardless whether Moscow had to convert the East German leader to its views or whether it only strengthened his own, an alliance between the GDR and the Soviet Union aimed at demonstrating to the Poles and the East Ger-

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IN THIS ISSUE

■ THE BALANCE OF POWER

Changing demands put new strains on wherewithal of the West

This is a slightly abridged version of the views voiced by Karl Kaiser at a hearing of the European and Middle East affairs sub-committee of the US House of Representatives. Professor Kaiser is director of the research department of the German Foreign Policy Association and holds the chair of political science at Cologne University.

The West faces several new challenges for which it does not have adequate concepts or experience of cooperation or appropriate institutions, not to mention political strategies.

First the West as a whole faces a threat to its security from the Soviet Union in a vital area of interest outside Nato. Neither detente policy nor its defence strategy provide an adequate answer to this.

The West's economic security today has just as high a priority as its military security. *In the event of war, the threat to the West's economy would probably be greater than the strictly military threat. Countering this threat is, inevitably, beyond the capacities of the various defence institutions at present and would require cooperation between partners with totally different foreign policies.*

For the first time there are serious differences between the Soviet Union and the Third World, especially the Islamic countries. International politics have taken on a new dimension, which requires appropriate decisions from the West.

Furthermore the world has changed radically. The Third World is plagued by unrest, upheavals and instability which cause conflicts in detente and between these states. There are now more grey zones in world politics — zones in which the risks for the superpowers involved are becoming incalculable.

The present crisis is so fundamental that the West will have to mobilise all its resources and creative power to prevent wars and make at least a few modest steps towards a reasonable world order.

At a time when understanding of the crisis in the West is underdeveloped, its policies are still open and its capacity to act is questionable, mutual accusations about lack of support from allies or the failure of the United States to overcome these problems are scarely helpful, indeed counter productive.

The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan did not cause but merely underlined the increasing differences of perspective in which the Europeans and the United States see detente. Europe's experience of detente has, on the whole, been positive.

A modus vivendi has been achieved thanks to numerous bilateral treaties between West Germany and socialist countries, the Four Power agreement on Berlin and multilateral negotiations.

Despite occasional setbacks, detente has led to an improvement in East-West relations in Europe.

The American experience has been completely different. The American perspective has been global and strategic in nature. Their central concern has been the balance of nuclear power between themselves and the Soviet Union and Soviet activity world wide.

Despite progress in the sphere of atomic arms control, home support for detente has been gradually declining since the Jackson-Vadik amendment. It has now almost reached zero.

Detente has not helped reduce Soviet activity in the Third World. On the contrary the Soviet Union gained ground in Africa and Asia in the seventies. It increasingly built up its naval capacity with which it helps guarantee its power world wide.

Detente does not affect the average American, who tends to regard it as a failure because of Soviet activity. In Western and Eastern Europe it has had a definite effect on millions.

This does not mean that the Western *Europeans regard the European defence situation with complacency. Within Nato, Western European members have made numerous attempts to counter the Warsaw Pact's superiority in the field of* conventional weapons and its growing *superiority in the field of tactical nuclear weapons.*

But in theory and in practice Western European Nato members deal with defence and detente in Western Europe simultaneously.

This is the attitude against which American criticism has been publicly directed. It is also the reason why the Americans have complained that the Europeans have derived unilateral benefits from detente. Whatever positive aspects of this modus vivendi are mentioned, this judgement is obviously shared by the West as a whole.

The United States would be the first to be affected by any increase in tension in central Europe, in Berlin for example. The achievements of detente are just as much a common matter as defence policy in Europe.

Many Americans regard the European interest in maintaining detente as further proof that the European countries



are becoming victims of Finlandisation or, to use an even less appropriate term, of "Euro-neutralism." As everywhere in international politics, improved relations bring advantages to both sides, who are then naturally interested in maintaining them.

It is one thing to pursue policies which bring obvious advantages for stability in Western Europe. It is quite another thing to regard such policies as a symptom of a move away from Nato towards Moscow.

If this were the case, then West Germany, which with its *Ostpolitik* made a major contribution to the modus vivendi, would not also between 1970 and 1980 have become the Nato country with the second highest per capita expenditure on defence (and the highest in Europe).

In the last 10 years, West Germany has increased its defence contribution by 3 per cent per annum in real terms. It also supported the United States in the Olympic boycott and played an important part in bringing up the question of the correction of the imbalance of nuclear medium range potential.

The argument that a jeopardising of stability in Europe would help the solution of the Middle East problem in a certain direction does not convince. On the contrary, imprudent policies in Europe could worsen the situation there without solving any Middle East problems.

It is in the interest of the West to use the few regions where a modus vivendi between East and West has been achieved as a starting point for further initiatives.

Nonetheless, the question of whether increased East-West tension in the Third World could affect detente in Europe — the concept of the indivisability of detente — is a central theme in the debate between Europeans and Americans and indeed inside the countries involved.

The greatest differences of opinion probably arose over East-West trade and the economic boycott.

There are fundamental differences between the structure of American and European trade with Eastern Europe. The Europeans export more equipment and machines (40 per cent of German exports to the Soviet Union come into this category) whereas most American exports are agricultural products.

European trade with the East therefore requires more complex and *long-term relations than that of the United States, which can be stepped up or reduced almost at will.*

When the Europeans failed to comply with all American demands for an economic boycott of the Soviet Union *following its invasion of Afghanistan, there* were important differences of opinion.

Most Europeans were sceptical about an economic boycott because of the many policies of getting round it. As yet, no convincing proof that this attitude is wrong has been furnished. Doubts about the efficacity of such a boycott have also been voiced in the USA.

It is often argued that East-West trade only benefits the East. This overlooks the fact that in a world where resources are scarce, the import of raw materials and energy is of vital and increasing importance for the Western European economy. The problem is different in the case of highly developed technology which indirectly can be used for arms purposes. Here the West has agreed on intensifying the Cocom limitations.

Is Eastern trade a trap making it easier for the Soviet Union to put pressure on West Europe?

In general, Europeans stress the element of interdependency that this trade creates. The Soviet Union would think twice before refusing to supply Western Europe with raw materials because it is heavily dependent on Western equipment. It is in our interest to cut the Soviet Union off from trade with the West and thus to strength Soviet elements which advocate autarchy? The West needs urgently to clarify its ideas on its long-term relations with the Soviet Union.

Americans and European assessments of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have tended to converge in the course of 1980 and the outlines of a broad consensus are now visible.

The invasion is regarded as a threat for three main reasons: first it was the *Soviet Union's first major military intervention outside the Warsaw Pact* (or the first extension of the Brezhnev doctrine to a Third World country) ... invasion brought the Soviet ... siderably nearer to the main ... western oil.

Third, the invasion provides ... et Union with a better ... direct and indirect intervention ... instable region which is of major importance.

Americans and Europeans ... line must be drawn to prevent Soviet expansion in the Middle East, South West Asia, and that ... ments are needed to overcome ... The disagreements have been ... cisely how this it to be done.

The main cause of ... tween Europeans and Americans probably been the question of ... military force.

Here, too, the Afghanistan ... tensified discussion which ... begun when the question ... United States of how the ... guarantee its oil supplies ...

One proposal was the ... of a strategic intervention ... then the dominant view ... seemed to be that such forces ... uses in certain situations ... are not always necessarily the ... of protecting Western interests ... pean discussions references ... made to the Iranian example ... many unstable regimes and ... been warnings that new dangers ... arise — social revolutions ... turmoil — where the use of ... force would be out of the question.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the argument was heard ... Soviet Union could only ... threaten Western security while ... sical case — an invading army ... state borders — was improbable ... could be the use of military ... *there were secret agreements* ... the government of a country ... Soviet Union to the effect that ... *et Union would be called in* ... a pro-Soviet regime were threatened.

Although this question was ... *cussed in the United States,* the ... lantic debate on this issue was ... in tone. In the United States there ... growing sense of the importance ... urgency of drawing a line following ... Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. ... ropean argument that the use of ... power was questionable in some ... and that it was necessary ... abroad-based political and ... concept to overcome the crisis ... a negative response from the ... public.

The Americans tended to ... Europeans reaction as an ... dodge responsibility and leave ... ous military tasks solely to ... they (the Europeans) concentrate ... non-military tasks. European ... with American demands was ... tensified by the fact that American

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■ PEOPLE IN DIPLOMACY

Nato: the options as seen by Rolf Pauls

... article is based on an interview with ... Pauls, Bonn's first ambassador in ... , where he made a name for himself ... an icebreaker. He went on to represent ... in Washington and Peking.

It has become fashionable in the West to talk of Nato erosion. It is a fashion spawned by self doubt; and it implies that the North Atlantic pact is steadily becoming less able to cope with the ... growing Soviet military machine.

But generalisations can easily be misleading. The Nato alliance of 15 states is ... as powerful as member-governments make it. Yet it has also evolved a personality of its own that sets aside individual claims in favour of the collective interest.

Much of this never reaches the general public, but what goes on among military and political leaders is more positive than the manner in which it is portrayed in the press.

Let us assume Nato stands by its resolve to increase defence spending by three per cent per annum in real terms. Let us also assume it puts its long-term programme into practice and establishes a Eurostrategic capacity to help counterbalance an overwhelming Soviet superiority.

If it were to succeed on both counts it would have established a Nato deterrent and defence potential that is much better than the picture pundits are currently painting.

This note of subdued optimism is struck by Rolf Pauls, who until his retirement a few weeks ago was Bonn's ambassador to Nato in Brussels for four years.

In the course of his diplomatic career he was his country's first ambassador to Israel and the first head of a Bonn mission in mainland China. He then served a five-year term as ambassador to the United States.

Pauls is critical by nature. The conclusions he reaches from his diplomatic career are based on subtle distinctions and come in various shades of light and dark.

Basing his judgements on experience of the Middle East, America and Peking, he takes a wide-ranging view of Nato in international political terms.

Since Nato was called into being more than 30 years ago the situation it faced has changed well and truly and the concept of security policy has taken on new dimensions.

It is centred on and revolves around an ocean going Soviet navy in being on the seven seas, a Red Fleet that is in a position to control and if need be blockade major sea routes.

Since the industrialised nations of the West are utterly dependent on oil and commodity shipments this Soviet capability strikes at a vital nerve as far as they are concerned.

The warship rather than the tank has taken *pride of place as the spearhead of global Soviet expansion* by way of world revolution.

How, then, is Nato to protect Western interests outside its own territory? It could certainly do so, he feels, but not Nato and not under the Nato aegis. He sees no prospect of Nato enlargement. Since this is a decision that would have to be taken unanimously, any such move would surely be vetoed by smaller Nato members, such as Denmark, Norway, Holland or Belgium.

The North Atlantic pact would then be in danger of collapse. Energy would *be squandered to no effect that is* urgently required elsewhere.

The only feasible solution is, he *argues, a pragmatic,* flexible approach coordinated by Nato but taking the strengths and opportunities of each member-country into account.

"It is not merely a matter of safeguarding the key oil and commodity supplies *essential for the survival of Europe; it is* also one of helping unstable regions to gain greater stability and giving countries *whose independence is threatened a* greater sense of security."

There are plans to set up mobile intervention units as a kind of fire brigade for swift action overseas. The main burden would be borne by the United States.

But other maritime powers could lend it support, especially Britain, which as second-largest Nato naval power runs a considerable, continually modernised fleet.

America's allies would at least have to plug the gaps left in Europe by the withdrawal of US forces for service overseas.

Pauls feels the Baltic approaches are a neuralgic *point of naval and air* defences. Sixty per cent of Soviet shipyard capacity is concentrated in the Baltic ports.

In addition to pressure on the Danish straits out towards the Atlantic there is *pressure on the Baltic approaches from* the North Sea and the Arctic Ocean, where Soviet forces are poised to strike from the Kola peninsula.

This makes Denmark's dwindling defence preparedness all the more alarming, especially the inclination in Copenhagen to slash Danish fleet-building programmes to ribbons.

Nato erosion of the kind currently dubbed "Denmarkisation" is beginning to spread to Belgium where, with all eyes transfixed by nationality and language problems, attempts are being made to deal with the financial hardship this highly developed country is undergoing by means of swingeing defence cuts.

The Belgian navy is as good as laid up and Belgium has completely withdrawn its commitment to take part in this year's round of autumn Nato manoeuvres.

Pauls takes a more positive view of France's role than is customary. It must not, he says, be viewed solely in terms of French non-participation in Nato military integration.

As both an Atlantic and a Mediterranean naval power France runs two strong fleets. It also maintains a squadron in the Indian Ocean, which is in such danger nowadays.

In West Africa France has repeatedly intervened militarily by way of Western solidarity.

Conscription must be introduced by all Nato countries, he feels, otherwise the pact cannot look forward confidently to the 80s.

This is particularly true of the United States, where reintroduction of the draft *is mainly a matter of improving manpower quality.*

After a five-year stint as Bonn's ambassador in Washington he is less worried about the further development of ties between Bonn and Washington than by *tendencies in the public political* consciousness of Western Europe to undermine the intellectual groundwork of *transatlantic security policy.*

He refers to a wave of anti-Americanism and attributes it to the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate and to a dilettante quality in US politics in recent years.



Rolf Pauls (Photo: Sven Simon)

The Americans may be accused of weak leadership yet when, as in the current Afghanistan crisis, they take unilateral decisions they are promptly criticised for not consulting their allies first.

The problem, Pauls says, is much more serious. Current anti-Americanism entails an attack on the United States because it is seen as a bulwark of positive security policy.

The aim is to drive a wedge between Europe and America. This has been Soviet policy for long. So let us take good care not to become the Kremlin's useful idiots by virtue of our anti-Americanism, he warns.

No-one should be misled into believing the United States incapable of vitality and powers of regeneration. America is not a world power about to leave the stage. It is a great nation undergoing a

Continued on page 4

Following in Bismarck's footsteps

Not everyone is in a position to say he is following in Bismarck's footsteps. But Andreas Meyer-Landrut is.

If the idea were even to occur to Bonn's new man in Moscow, who is an experienced diplomat by any criterion, he would be sure to point out that more than 120 years are a long time, quite apart from other differences.

The country in which Bismarck and he will have represented Germany has, for instance, a different capital — and the difference is more than symbolic.

Even so, points in common still apply. Meyer-Landrut is the new ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Soviet Union; Bismarck presented his credentials to the Czar's court in St Petersburg in 1859.

Hans-Georg Wieck, Meyer-Landrut's predecessor in the somewhat faded sobriety of the embassy building in Gruzinskaya Ulitsa, has left for Brussels, where he will represent Bonn at Nato.

But Meyer-Landrut is no newcomer to Moscow. Not long after he qualified for the foreign service he spent time in the Soviet capital.

He will find no shortage of acquaintances there either. He served as head of the Soviet department at the Bonn Foreign Office from 1972, since when many of his opposite numbers in Moscow have climbed the career ladder in the Soviet hierarchy.

Incidentally, he not only speaks Russian; he is a master of it. This is not only the exception among German diplomats in Russia; it deserves special mention.



Andreas Meyer-Landrut (Photo: Bundesbildstelle)

It may, indeed, prove specially useful in a country where the leaders still suffer from a complex because their language is still, or so they feel, a low ranker elsewhere in the world.

Much thought has been devoted to the role and specific weight carried by ambassadors in the age of telecommunications.

But standard views do not apply to the representative of what is a medium-sized power in the capital of the East bloc's superpower.

What is more, Moscow itself, like St Petersburg before it, has always taught its ambassadors more than the ability to hold champagne glasses at receptions.

Abrassimov and Vinogradov are good examples, Falin, an outstanding one. They are typical of the yardstick by which ambassadors have been measured in Moscow since the days of Peter the Great, if not earlier.


Bonn's new man in Moscow was born in Reval in 1929, a city variously known as Tallinn, Lindanissa and Kolovan. Since this *summer yachtsmen* at least will have known from the Olympic regatta that it is in Estonia on the Baltic.

It is a city that has had many names because it lies at the confluence of East and West, albeit very much in Europe. The advantages of Meyer-Landrut's origins go without saying.

May his path be guided by Bismarck's motto: *Patriae inservienda consumor* (I wear myself out in the service of my country).

It is far from impossible in view of his proverbial enthusiasm for hard work. But one can but hope that he will remain at his post for some time to come; his services are needed.

Wolf J. von Kleist
(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, 12 October 1980)



A growing number of Social Democrats feel that Hans-Jochen Vogel is the ideal man to solve the party's leadership problem.

Herr Vogel, a 54-year-old Bavarian Catholic, may well be cut out to resolve the succession issue in either the parliamentary party, the government or the party at large.

In the wake of an election performance that brought the Social Democrats an increase of only 0.3 per cent of the vote (to 42.9 per cent) questions about the direction of the party are being asked.

People are demanding to know who is to blame for the poll result.

Icy winter

Continued from page 1

sive is a prelude. It is obvious that the prime target is not Bonn but that the whole thing is aimed at lowering the iron curtain once more.

It was no coincidence that in his recent speech in Gera, in East Germany, Honecker combined his attack on West Germany with the Polish issue.

Poland, he said, "is inseparably linked to the world of socialism, and together with our friends we shall ensure that this remains so."

The people of the GDR were told of the seriousness of the situation and prepared for what might come.

There is a sword of Dámocles hanging over the courageous Polish people. Should it drop, the Poles will suffer a similar fate as the Hungarians in 1956 and the Czechs in 1968.

There can be no doubt as to Moscow's determination to sever the silver thread should Warsaw prove unruly. The unity of the Soviet camp is a must, and takes priority over all policy towards the West.

Moreover, Moscow and East Berlin impute to the West the intention to exert influence in Poland and thus promote the destruction of the Communist bloc.

Eastern media point to the support for the Gdansk strikers. In fact, Helmut Schmidt unwittingly promoted this alleged collaboration by cancelling his meeting with Erich Honecker for fear that any shoot-out in Poland could force him to leave East Germany abruptly and thus sever a contact — something Honecker, always concerned about his reputation, would have regarded as an insult and hence unforgivable.

The cancellation of the visit by Helmut Schmidt was interpreted in the East as siding with the Polish rebels.

What matters in the East is not the world as it is but as it is imagined behind closed doors.

What happens to the Poles will be greatly influenced by the outcome of the American presidential election. Like Bonn, Moscow and East Berlin do not disregard the possibility of Ronald Reagan winning.

Should this happen, the Soviets would make use of the fact that the United States would be politically somewhat incapacitated for at least a year while the new president and his staff find their feet.

Any change of presidency in the United States has always been regarded by Moscow as a welcome opportunity to test the newcomer and, if possible, gain ground.

In view of this constellation, Bonn's efforts to make the GDR change its present stance, be it by stick or by carrot, are doomed to failure for the time being.

Jürgen Engert

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 17 October 1980)

THE PARTIES

A Bavarian waits in the SPD wings

The quiet and reliable figure of the Bonn Justice Minister is gradually coming to represent political quality.

His name is mentioned as soon as the future of the SPD is brought up.

Vogel, not Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski, is seen by many as the man best suited to take over when, at some time in the uncertain future, Herbert Wehner finally calls it a day as the Social Democrats' leader in the Bundestag.

This development does not come entirely as a surprise, merely a little earlier than had been expected. For some time it has been clear that Vogel's star has been rising in Bonn.

It certainly took its time after the former mayor of Munich during the Olympic Games found himself ruthlessly deprived of his political base after an SPD vendetta in Bavaria.

More and more often, and regardless of political leanings, people have praised his political work.

Increasing respect has been voiced for his work as a versatile Cabinet Minister and a prudent member of the SPD's national executive.

Many of those who have been at loggerheads with him in years gone by and discovered to their cost how relentlessly he can dispose of opponents may wonder whether he has really changed.

Viewed in this light it remains to be seen whether Vogel has developed the characteristics that distinguish a democratic leader from an authoritarian one.

He has nonetheless shown himself capable of extreme caution in making use of his influence in the powerful right wing of the SPD — a far cry from his Munich days.

At the Berlin SPD conference the relatively well-organised right wing made short shrift of the left in voting for membership of the national executive.

It was, perhaps, a gesture of revenge for the treatment the right had suffered from the left in the past, but Vogel had not favoured such drastic action.

Egon Franke's right-wing backbenchers recently invited the relatively left-wing MP Wolfgang Roth to their Bonn "local", the Kesenicher Hof.

This was more in keeping with Vogel's new approach.

It was, however, these same right-wingers who made parliamentary party leader Herbert Wehner feel his influence was growing more limited over an issue of symbolic importance.

The right, led by Egon Franke and Annemarie Renger, put paid to the creation of working parties to follow the progress of the coalition talks on the parliamentary party's behalf.

They did so because the working parties were to include seven of the 63 new SPD Bundestag members, including three left-wingers.

There was no sign of an opening or of greater flexibility when it came to an issue such as this.

It makes the going difficult for the bid to integrate the party, a task in which Wehner succeeded four years ago. It will, when all is said and done, prove arduous enough as it is.

In view of the organisational efficiency and success of the SPD's right wing (despite its being less known among the public), left-wingers now plan to cooperate more too.

They recently conferred in Bonn and certainly hit on a name that sounds impressive, choosing to call themselves the Parliamentary Left.

These activities by the left-wing partisans probably annoy Wehner even more than the cross-purposes of the right-wingers, who will now feel obliged to join forces even more staunchly.

Wehner was doubtless also annoyed by Willy Brandt's latest move in frankly singing Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski's praises as Wehner's future deputy as leader of the party in the House.

Formally this move was a breach of the right of the parliamentary party leader, or at least those of the parliamentary party, and as such it was intended. This is your Party leader speaking, Brandt implied.

But he too has his limits. The general secretary alongside whom he works day by day for the party cannot b... inated over the head of C... Schmidt.

So Egon Bahr's successor a... secretary will not be Wolfgang ... whom the Chancellor would no... see in the job.

The choice will thus be ... Friedhelm Farthmann, 49, Welfa... ister of North Rhine-Westphal... Peter Glotz, 41, West Berlin Se... Education.

But Brandt did undertake ... and farsighted staff work a... point in the party machine ... behest the party set up six com... to probe future issues that were ... ed in the 1980 general electio... paign.

One of them will deal with ... the world, an issue that ... terms can only be viewed in ... with disarmament and the inter... economic order.

Brandt's proposal for the ma... this commission must have co... surprise to all, not least to th... himself.

It was Hans-Jochen Vogel ... cepted the nomination because ... have realised that chairmanship ... SPD policy commission may ... him into the foreign policy sphe... which he must be conversant if h... aspire to higher office.

If Brandt's assurance that Wisch... ki's additional job as Wehner's de... in no way anticipating the deci... Wehner's successor is taken a... value, another post-Wehner opti... be seen to take shape.

It is the prospect of Hans-J... Vogel from Munich as leader of t... liamentary party and foremost p... partner of Helmut Schmidt, the ... cellor, from Hamburg.

Unlike Wischnewski, it is ... to assume, Vogel could main... parliamentary party's weight in d... with the Cabinet and the Chanc... the vacuum that would inevitably ... on the departure of Herbert Wehn...

The Chancellor feels the ... sense of respect towards Vogel ... what is more, Vogel lacks neither ... ligence nor self-confidence in c... son with the Chancellor.

He and Schmidt share the unfor... characteristic of being regarded by ... as arrogant even when he has n... intention.

Werner A. Pe...

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonnt... 19 Octob...)

Nato options

Continued from page 3

crisis from which it will emerge with a more mature understanding of its role.

In other respects too Pauls trenchantly puts paid to ideas such as the suggestion that there is no alternative to the policy of detente.

This, he says, is to transmit the wrong signal to the other side — as though we were prepared to pay any price for so-called detente.

This encourages the other side to step up its demands time and again. The West's desire for detente is less important than what the Soviet Union takes it to mean.

For Moscow detente means worldwide progress for communism but without open, armed conflict. It would be clearer thinking and more to the point to refer to a policy of reducing tension.

Peace nowadays is threatened by nothing more ominously than by an upset in the East-West power balance. The call for indivisibility of detente must remain theoretical as long as the West is not politically determined to counter Soviet expansion in the Third World.

Afghanistan is not an individual case, it is a link in a chain. If the Western response to Soviet aggression weakens in this part of the world the door will be opened to drastic further expansion by Soviet imperialism.

As a connoisseur of China from his days as ambassador in Peking Pauls readily moves from Europe to the Far East. There is much talk of playing the China card, he says, but this figure of speech is misleading.

China will need decades before it can really emerge as a world power, but it is already an extraordinary factor in world affairs by virtue of its surface area, its population, its ethnic homogeneity (unlike the Soviet Union) and its enormous economic potential.

It is likewise already an extraordinary factor in the security context, relieving the burden on Europe by tieing down Soviet military potential.

Rolf Pauls was a career offic... armed forces by profession. He ... arm in the early days of the ... campaign.

Later he led a defeated div... the Western front to a ... breakthrough from encirclement ... awarded the *Ritterkreuz*, a disti... service medal, in 1944.

In Israel, a soldier's state, thi... him respect on his delicate mis... Tel Aviv as Bonn's first am... there. Respect was later to beco... tual sympathy and liking.

"Europeans in general and ... mans in particular," he now ... "should always bear in mind ... stant responsibility for Israel and ... curity.

"This holds good regardless ... proval of whatever policy the Isra... vernment of the day may happe... vocate. It is a question of self-est...

"If you let down a friend in ne... forfeit all claim to respect yourself..."

Wolfgang ...

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ ... 10 Octob...)

RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

Cologne's Cardinal Höffner outlines hopes for Pope's visit

The Pope's visit to West Germany next month will not be "exorbitant-expensive", according to a senior ...ember of the Catholic clergy.

Cologne's Cardinal Höffner told a ...ess conference that the visit would not ... showy or sensational.

It would be "an impulse for inner re...ewal; peace; love of our neighbours; aid ...or those in need throughout the world; ...d, finally, for a turning towards our ...rd and saviour."

The conference was held to counter ...ccusations that have been made about ...he costs of the visit.

Cardinal Höffner compared the Pope's ...isit with a number of secular events. He argued that state visits, world cham...pionships, festivals and Olympic Games ...ere financed from public funds. He ...aid there was nothing very unusual ...bout a contribution by the Bonn go...ernment the *Länder* and the local ...ouncils to the Pope's visit.

Höffner said that the archdiocese of Cologne would probably not be bank...upted if it had to pay all the costs of ...e Pope's visit. But he was counting on ...artnerly cooperation. The city council ...ould have to provide infrastructure for ...e *Butzweilerhof* for the mass the Pope ...ould be saying there. But this infrastructure would finally benefit the city council because it was, in any case, planning an industrial estate there.

There are no collections among German catholics for the Pope's visit. Höffner said that the bishops had decided as a matter of policy not to do this.

But there will be a special collection in all churches on 9 November before the visit. The proceeds will go, at the Pope's wishes, to victims of African drought.

In only one case does the Cardinal know exactly who is going to foot the bill.

The Pope will on 15 November pay an official state visit to President Carstens.

Vowed the Cardinal: "The Church cannot be expected to fork out for this."

It is not yet known whether there will be a meeting between the Pope and Chancellor Schmidt. This is outside Cardinal Höffner's ambit. This part of the programme will be discussed between the Bonn and Vatican governments and will shortly be announced jointly by them.

By contrast, the ecclesiastical part of the programme has been worked out in minute detail. It begins on 15 November in Cologne and ends on the evening of 19 November in Munich.

In Cologne the Pope will visit the Minoritenkirche, where Adolf Kolping, founder of the Kolping houses, and the noted medieval scholastic philosopher, John Duns Scotus, are buried.

This new item on the Pope's agenda cannot be read as a sign that Kolping is about to be beatified according to Höffner. He said the process could hardly be completed this year.

Whether this programme will be stuck to as meticulously as it has been planned will depend on such things as the weather and indeed on the Pope himself. It is planned that he will travel to the various places in his pilgrimage by helicopter. In case of bad weather the Pope will be able to switch to a special train.

No one knows where and when the Pope will break through protocol in his familiar way. On his previous visits, he has hardly ever stuck to protocol. Cardinal Höffner recalled the Pope's visit to Cracow where he spent three hours longer than planned talking to students and singing songs, ignoring the pleadings of the organisers to leave.

There will be plenty of opportunities for the Pope to break through protocol on his visit to Germany, too. The mass masses — at the *Butzweilerhof* in Cologne, in the Osnabrück stadium, Mainz airport, Fulda cathedral square, the Kapellplatz in Altötting and the Theresienwiese in Munich — may all last longer than planned.

The Pope's encounters with various groups incluce:

- In Cologne Cathedral with students and scientists
- In Osnabrück with representatives of German Jews
- In Mainz with representatives of non-Catholic churches, with Poles and other foreign groups.
- In Fulda with German and foreign bishops, Catholic layman and the central committee of German Catholics
- In Munich with young and old, with artists and journalists.

The question of how the Pope is going to cope with all this in only a few days is not wholly inappropriate.

This is his working style, says Cardinal Höffner. Few could keep up with his pace, he said. And he told of a Synod of Bishops now meeting in Rome: it lasted from just before 9am to 1pm. The Pope was there all the time. While the bishops were taking a coffee break, he held several audiences. Then came more in the afternoon. Yet in the evenings the Pope seemed as fresh as ever.

The preparations for the Pope's visit have caused considerable strain and not a few headaches.

Reiner Dederichs

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 17 October 1980)

Changing demands on West

Continued from page 2

...tinuing calls for a vague European commitment to military involvement in the Middle East came at a time when Washington had no clear policy for de...velopments in the Middle East and was also undecided militarily.

There was also a difference in the ...ssessment of the attitudes of the non-...ligned countries. After the unparalleled condemnation of the Soviet Union at the United Nations General Assembly — especially by important Third World and Middle East states — the Europeans came to the conclusion that non-aligned countries had an important independent part to play in the prevention of further Soviet expansion — though they would not necessarily need to agree with Wes...tern strategies on all points.

Therefore the Americans tended to stress the East-West dimension of the Afghanistan crisis more than the Europeans, who pointed out the need and the possibility of including the Third World in their strategies. Although a wider measure of agreement has since been reached between the allies, the controversy continues.

Here elements of a division of labour between Europe and American become visible. The Europeans have intensified their efforts to improve the balance of military power in Europe. This means that potential American reserves are re...leased which are needed in other parts of the world. The European Community is becoming an increasingly important instrument in the coordination of di...plomacy towards the Middle East. The EEC is attempting to use a broad spec...trum of economic and political factors to strengthen the independence and scope for action of states in the Middle East region.

The Euro-Arab dialogue, especially contacts with the Gulf states, aid to Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan and coordinated activities of the Nine in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict all serve the purpose of contributing to a Western strategy in the Middle East.

This goes some way to explaining the hastiness of some moves following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as well as American impatience and emphatic insistence that the Europeans comply with its demands. The Europeans tried to maintain a front of solidarity with the American on the hostage issue. Nonetheless, they found themselves in increasing disagreement with American policies because they believed they would benefit the radicals in Iran and increase the danger of the country being plunged into chaos, and thus driven into the arms of the Soviet Union.

As the hostage crisis intensified, the Europeans increasingly got the impression that American policy was being dictated by the demands of home policy and the tendency to over-react.

Faced with erratic policies, the Europeans found that the wisest course was to ignore American calls for immediate action, let time pass and wait for Washington's policies to become clearer and more consistent. The result was that the urgency of American appeals increased, as did European discontent about the unilateral nature of actions aimed at forcing America's allies to act in compliance with American wishes.

For the first time Americans made the shocking discovery that part of European public opinion regarded the Soviet Union and the United States in much the same light — as superpowers who were endangering world peace because of their lack of self-control.

First: the present crisis raises fundamental questions which require more than adaptations of policy to events. The West will have to thoroughly rethink its appreach to questions cooperation with the Middle East and the Soviet Union and of economic security and policies towards the Third World.

Second: As a coordinated approach to the new problems is, at best, only just beginning to emerge, the Western states should agree to regard lack of an immediate response not as a sign of indecision or even of disloyalty but as an expression of the difficulty of the problem.

Third: the United States, the most important countries in Western Europe and, if necessary, Japan, should together work out what their aims are and what options are available to them: first in relation to Soviet Middle East policy, second in relation to the maintaining of Western economic security and third in relation to Third World policy.

A minimum of agreement will have to be reached about what contribution each state is prepared to make and what part political, economic and military means should play.

Fourth: it would be unrealistic to expect a perfectly coordinated and consistent Western global strategy. The West's heterogeneity makes this impossible; and the nature of the problems to be overcome means that it is perhaps not even desirable.

However, the identity of fundamental interests within the West is so strong that a division of labour within a coordinated procedure is not only indispensable but possible. The principal Western European countries are prepared to make a contribution to the defence of the West and the maintaining of peace outside Europe.

It goes without saying that the precise nature of any country's contribution will depend on its geography, its economic strength and its history. And so the United States as a world power with a global capacity outside Europe will have to take on the main military role. But Europe cannot stand idly by and watch. Some European states could use their economic and political onfluence in regions where they have leverage.

Fifth: In the discussion of military strategies, the relationship between cooperation and competition in dealings with the Soviet Union merits special attention. The West will have to face the fact that both are necessary. Both have a legitimate part to play in the interests of maintaining minimal conditions necessary for ensuring peace.

Sixth: After the elections in West Germany, the United States and France, 1981 ought to be the year in which intensive efforts are made to talk of the West's aims in the present crisis and the means it has at its disposal of achieving them. The driving force behind such deliberations would be an institution consisting of the leading Western countries: Japan, West Germany, Great Britain, France and the United States. Other Western countries, for example the participants in economic summits and the European Community, could take part also. Such a plan would require constant dialogue and consultation between representatives of governments who would be specially nominated for this task and be appointed for long periods. At the same time, Western parliaments ought to devote more attention to these problems to provide the democratic legitimation for measures which prove to be indispensable.

(Die Zeit, 17 October 1980)

THE ECONOMY

Slight recovery will follow dip – the consensus opinion

The autumn is traditionally the time for economic forecasts. The common report of the economic research institutes is due at the end of this month, followed in the second half of November by the annual report of the Council of Experts.

The government pundits are preparing their basic economic data for the draft budget for 1981 and the medium term financial plan until 1984.

Of course, nobody can look as far ahead as 1984. But the basic data for 1981 seem relatively safe: One per cent (adjusted for inflation) economic growth; slightly more than one million unemployed; and an inflation rate for consumer goods of between 4 and 4.5 per cent.

But such basic annual averages are of little use in describing the course of the economy and in helping consumers and investors plan.

Here, the anticipated cyclical course of the most important supply and demand data during the time under review would seem more useful.

Seen from today's vantage point and based on the latest statistical data and projections of the business community, there seems to be general consensus on the course of the economy.

For the two-year period 1980/81 the picture that presents itself resembles a twisted U: based on current growth rates, economic activities in 1980 show a downward trend. This will reach its nadir in the winter with a reduced GNP (adjusted for inflation).

Next year there will be a recovery. But this will not be pronounced enough to provide a growth rate markedly above stagnation level.

These are roughly the basic data for the expectations described as follows: The influx of industrial orders has been lagging behind last year's levels for months; the percentage of idle production capacities has been rising, as has the number of jobless.

In the second quarter of this year (the last available figures) the GNP in real terms, the most comprehensive indicator of overall economic production, declined one per cent against the first quarter (adjusted for seasonal elements).

The trend, experts of the Economic Affairs Ministry in Bonn say, will apply for the third quarter as well. And the remainder of the year is unlikely to bring a change.

It is therefore not surprising that the estimated 2.5 per cent growth projection made at the beginning of the year will now have to be reduced to two per cent.

If businessmen and consumers were to go only by these current economic data, they would have to anticipate a long and deep recession. But they evidently don't.

Though the economic barometer published by the Ifo Institute shows a decline, everybody seems to agree with the professional economic weathermen that next year will bring a slight upward trend again. And everybody says: "It won't be as bad as 1974/75."

Where does all this confidence come from?

As opposed to the time of the oil shock in the early 1970s, the business community has now realised that attempts at saving energy and at using alternative sources of energy require investment.

Businessmen now no longer consider that rising oil prices spell the end of economic dynamism in the Western world. Instead, they anticipate the beginning of a new wave of innovation.

And since nobody quite knows which course technical progress will take, this realisation has not yet resulted in spectacular new orders. But the very anticipation of growing investment to overcome energy shortages is enough to keep the investment level relatively stable.

This is reflected in the influx of orders: in some months during the recent decline, domestic orders in the capital goods industry have been the only statistical item with an upward trend.

There are two other reasons for the relative stability of investments: unlike the time before the 1974/75 recession, no excessive production capacities have been developed during the preceding upswing; and profits have not been whittled away because recent wage agreements have been much more in keeping with the economic position than those of the early 1970s.

The new economic data show that, in conjunction with relatively stable employment expectations, this can lead to considerable consumption.

Private consumption this year will show a greater growth rate (adjusted for inflation) than in 1974, which was preceded by heavy nominal wage increases.

Consumer attitudes are reflected in the relatively stable order statistics and, according to the banks, in a complete lack of apprehension savings that marked 1974/75.

This year's savings quota is likely to be around 14 per cent — a figure considered economically normal for the Federal Republic of Germany.

The role of exports in connection with the generally anticipated upswing is unclear at first glance. The simple explanation that the stability of the deutschemark and the quality of German goods would always guarantee good sales abroad no longer holds absolutely true.

German export figures have been marked by the world-wide climate of recession. But the deutschemark exchange rate and the economic constellation in the Western world have prevented any spectacular decline in world trade and so endowed the weakening economy with a certain degree of stability.

Measured by inflation rate differences in the various countries, the deutschemark should have appreciated. But this has been prevented by the unexpectedly high balance of payments deficit.

The deutschemark has depreciated this year in real terms. Contrary to all expectations, it stood for much of the year at the lower edge of the EMS exchange rate fluctuation scope.

This has boosted German exports — not as a result of a "currency subsidy" but as the normal consequence of inflexible and increasingly more expensive imports.

In addition (unlike in 1974/75) the present decline did not set in simultaneously in all countries. At the time recession started in the United States, France and Britain, Japan and Germany still has a boom.

Even without any summit resolution, they were thus able to act as [...]tives for world trade.

The relatively stable volume of trade in its turn kept export [...] high. All this is now a contribu[...]tor in encouraging most German [com]panies not to reduce their pro[duction] capacities in spite of the doldrums [...] nomic stability hinges on stable expectations.

Prices rank among the more [...] signs in these weeks. The inflation [rate] has not only stabilised but gone [...] Though it is still above 5 per [cent] prospects are good and next year [...]ly to see a 4 before the decimal [point] again. In fact, even just a plain [...] sible.

All this seems to indicate that economic policy makers are not [con]fronted with a rigid front only [...] prices and wages still have a certain [buf]fer function in the ups and downs of the economy.

We have become modest: a [...] slowdown of the inflation rate [...] downward trend would be regarded [as a] sign of such flexibility of the economy as a whole and welcomed.

But none of this is certain. The [im]pulse for the first steps leading [to] more stability comes from stagnating or indeed declining raw materials prices.

What remains of the "pressure [in the] inner tube" (Karl Schiller) in our do[]mestic economic circulation is unk[nown]. The present advance price levels do[n't] seem to exert any major pressure for the time being.

But given an economic decline [...] reduced increases in the produc[tivity] rate as a result of idle production [ca]pacities, costs could exert their influence on prices.

If this happened, the Bunde[sbank] would be faced with the alternat[ive of] providing or denying scope and th[us in]creasing the employment risks.

The Bundesbank should abstain [from] such a mock alternative by refusi[ng to] adapt the money supply to the [...] needs of the day.

Hans D. Bat[...]

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 October [...])

Two sides to devaluation argument

There is no reason to dramatise Germany's balance of payments deficit. But we cannot afford in the long run to spend (as will be the case this year) DM30bn more for imports of goods and services plus foreign travel than was earned abroad.

Added to this deficit are DM10bn in capital exports, which means that we are short of foreign exchange to the tune of DM40bn.

This huge hole is being plugged by borrowing abroad and by dipping into foreign exchange reserves. But we cannot continue this way for ever.

Some contemporaries, among them bankers and circles close to the trade unions — but not the head of the Federation of German Industry, Rodenstock, as some maintain — see the solution in a devaluation of the deutschemark.

They argue that this would make German goods cheaper for foreign buyers and hence more competitive and that our export opportunities would thus be improved. At the same time, our imports and holidays abroad would become more expensive and would therefore be curbed.

If it were really so easy, our monetary policy makers in Frankfurt and Bonn would surely have taken this step long ago.

After all, economic policy makers and the Bundesbank would be greatly relieved if they did not have to attract foreign money as a means of financing the current account deficit by having to offer high interest rates instead of reducing interests to boost the domestic economy.

The effects of a significant deutschemark devaluation would be much more complex than its proponents assume.

Granted, exports would profit. But then, they are already profiting due to the depreciation of the deutschemark as a result of the fact that the inflation rates abroad are almost twice as high as in Germany.

Moreover, the nominal value of the deutschemark abroad has also gone down slightly. But this depreciation has not acted as a brake on imports.

This is due to lack of elasticity in imports. No matter how high the price, the oil requirements cannot be reduced from one day to the next. And foreign sellers of finished and semi-finished goods which carry much weight in our imports will not permit themselves easily to be displaced from their strong position on the German market — a position they largely owe to low wages in their own countries. These are factors which probably do not occur in the figurings of the devaluation proponents.

The lack of import elasticity must increase the cost of imports. But there are also other negative devaluation e[ffects] that must not be overlooked. In an [eco]nomy as dependent on imports [as] ours, higher import prices soon [affect] domestic price levels.

This would result in higher [costs] (some of which would certainly [ema]nate from wages) and hence in a de[terio]ration of our international compe[titive]ness which would nullify the init[ial ad]vantages of a devaluation in the [...] field.

Many other countries have long [learn]ed this lesson and have struck [...] "devaluation competition" from [their] vocabularies.

If a marked devaluation is to [be suc]cessful it must be combined [with a] tough restrictive policy. And th[is would] inevitably cause an unprecedented [reces]sion in this country.

We must also — and above all — [not] overlook the fact that Germany is [in a] sensitive position inasmuch as [the] deutschemark has become the [...] most important reserve and [...] currency.

Foreign central banks have in[vested] DM60bn in deutschemark bonds. [...]er DM15bn worth of such paper [is] in the portfolios of other investors. [This] is augmented by tens of billions of [offi]cial and private deutschemark [...] with banks.

Should a deliberate depreciation of [the] deutschemark or indeed just mere [...]

Continued on page 7

ROAD SAFETY

Motorists resist seat-belt laws despite accident statistics

You can get children to brush their teeth by making raspberry-flavoured [to]othpaste, but how do you get motorists [to] fasten their seat belts?

They have been required by law to [do so] them since 1976 but seem largely [un]impressed so far. Must fines be im[po]sed to get the message across? Or are [th]ere other, more subtle methods that [m]ight do the trick?

The comparison with children's [to]othpaste was made by Professor Hans-[Jo]achim Förster, head of research at [Da]imler-Benz, at a conference in Bad [K]issingen, the North Bavarian health re[so]rt.

At first glance it seems at little far-[fet]ched to compare children and motor[ists] or toothpaste and seat belts, but sim[ilar]ities there certainly are.

Brushing teeth and fastening seat [be]lts are both useful and designed to [ke]ep you healthy and alive. The cost of [no]t doing either must, in the final anal[ys]is, be borne by the community as a [wh]ole, as nearly everyone knows.

Most motorists are well aware of the [ad]vantages they stand to derive from [wear]ing their belt, yet an increasing num[ber] don't bother.

Head counts last March reveal that [on]ly 63 per cent of drivers fasten their [be]lts out of town and a mere 42 per [ce]nt do so in built-up areas.

Yet roughly 80 per cent belt up on [th]e autobahn, where the accident risk is lower. There too, however, the percentage once was higher.

Doctors are worried. Lawyers are alarmed. So is the Road Safety Council in Bonn. The Bad Kissingen conference was to be accompanied by a 'belt up' campaign, possible the last before fines are imposed.

For by no means the first time safety campaigners appealed to the media to help increase the number of motorists using seat belts, especially on trunk roads and in town.

There is no need to marshal new facts or figures. Motorists already know the salient points. Nearly nine out of ten non-wearers admit to realising that belts reduce the injury risk in a collision.

Accident statistics indicate that the risk of serious injury is at least ten times higher if you don't fasten your seat belt, according to Dr Beier of Munich University.

He said six out of ten motorists were mistakenly worried they might not be able to extricate themselves from a burning vehicle if they were belted.

The percentage of car crashes resulting in serious injuries in which fire is involved is a mere 0.3, so statisticians are even prepared to risk hypotheses.

Professor Lenz of the Road Research Association, Cologne, said there would have been 1,300 fewer road deaths and 16,000 fewer serious injuries on West German roads last year if the drivers and front-seat passengers of private cars had all worn seat belts.

Does that make many motorists and co-drivers incorrigible, negligent or foolhardy because they refuse to fasten their safety belts despite being well aware of their advantages?

Or are they put off by irrational inhibitions such as the fear of being 'fettered'? Professor Lenz reckoned the anxiety felt by opponents of the belt was stronger than rational arguments on its behalf.

A survey by his association showed that about 20 per cent of motorists were generally in favour of seat belts, 48 per cent were in favour with certain reservations and 13 per cent were still undecided.

So he felt the number of incorrigible non-users of the belt, motorists whom not even the most forceful road safety campaign could persuade voluntarily to wear seat belts, was a mere four per cent.

By boosting the belt's image and suggesting, say, that the man who thinks of his wife and family will always remember to fasten his safety belt the percentage of belt-wearers ought, he felt, to be substantially increased.


So a positive image for the seat belt was his proposal for what would correspond to the raspberry flavouring in children's toothpaste.

The Road Safety Council still felt the belt could be made more popular by a further publicity campaign too.

An increasing number of people might say it was high time non-wearers were fined, but the council continued to feel the number of users could be improved without coercion, as it were.

This could well prove the case anyhow this winter. In ice and snow fewer occasional drivers take to the road, and they tend to fasten belts less often than regular motorists.

But if appeals prove of no avail, traffic specialists and doctors may rest assured of backing from the legal profession.



The trend, Herr Weber said, was toward a further increase of the share in blame in such cases to over 50 per cent on occasion.

The threat of losing insurance cover or a no claims bonus was intended to teach motorists a lesson, but did not prove really effective, he regretted.

The reason was that whereas claims to damages were reduced, other costs, such as medical expenses, were still covered by the insurance, or in other words, the community as a whole.

So this impeded the policy intention behind the court's rulings of safety belts. At the same time, however, Herr Weber denied allegations that he and his fellow-judges in Karlsruhe felt themselves to be educationalists.

He also saw no reason to assume that mandatory belt-wearing, with fines imposed for refusal to comply if need be, was unconstitutional.

In the past the bench had not taken such suggestions seriously, failing to see how car seat belts could possibly be considered an inroad into free development of individual personality.

The debate sounded strangely unreal to the average motorist. Pundits tend to think in overall terms, arguing for instance that in about 96 per cent of cases in which unbelted drivers and passengers had been injured a safety belt, if worn, would have been statistically of use.

The average motorist takes a somewhat different view of statistical likelihood. Accidents, he concludes from experience, seldom happen. And as for the injured, he never gets to see them; they are in hospital.

This argument makes some sense too. Statistically he will only be seriously injured in a road accident once every 60 years.

He is only likely to die a road death once every 1,000 years, as it were. So the temptation to forget about fastening seat belts is understandable.

Asked why he forgets, he will lay claim to anxiety of some kind or other or argue that wearing a belt is somehow unmanly or effeminate.

But traffic experts are keen to ensure that he always remembers. The Road Research Association argues in a report that the general public interest requires him to do so.

Wearing his belt cuts costs that must otherwise be borne by all. This is surely an argument that cannot, before long, fail to support the imposition of fines.

Unless, that is, some kind of raspberry flavour is found that makes fastening seat belts seem socially more desirable.

Konrad Mrusek

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 8 October 1980)

A matter of common sense, says judge

Justice Weber, presiding judge of the Sixth Senate of the Supreme Court in Karlsruhe, said in Bad Kissingen that motorists' refusal to see sense could not fail to influence case law rulings.

If need be, fines could prove indispensable, irksome though this would be. But the belt's advantages were so clearly proven that anyone with common sense remembered to fasten his belt.

Those who failed to do so were partly to blame for injuries they sustained even as a result of accidents for which they were not responsible.

The Supreme Court had endorsed this case law ruling at the end of September, increasing the share of the blame apportioned to an accident victim who had not worn his safety belt.

■ BOOKS

African debut at Frankfurt fair

Major features of Frankfurt Book Show were the announcement of this year's Nobel Prize for Literature, to Polish writer Czeslaw Milosz, and a protest by Black African publishers against the South African publishers taking part.

The Nobel Prize news obviously came as something of a surprise because Milosz' German publishers had none of his works in stock.

The protest by Black African publishers took the form of a one-day boycott. They closed their stalls.

It was a move that was ill-advised and self-defeating.

Ill-advised because the fair organisers are legally obliged to allow any publisher who wants to exhibit his books at the fair — even neo-Nazi publications are on show. The fair organisers cannot practise censorship.

Self-defeating because the Black African publishers thus lost some of the ground they had gained during the fair. And it would be even more self-defeating if, as they have threatened, they boycott next year's fair.

Though the fair organisers, publishers and media made tremendous efforts there is little likelihood of an African literature boom in this country.

Fair director Weidhaas said that only two per cent of exhibitors had a direct interest in Black Africa, the main theme of this year's fair.

Another blow was the news that the Walter Verlag, which specialises in books on Africa, is to cut its publishing programme.

Perhaps symptomatic of the problems of making African literature known in this country is the fact that the Reclam anthology of African poetry published in the sixties still has not been sold out.

Perhaps this pessimism is premature. Future fairs will show how successful this promotion of Black African literature has been.

The second major sensation at the fair was the news that this year's Nobel Prize for literature had been awarded to Czeslaw Milosz. The news obviously took Milosz' German publishers by surprise. Kiepenheuer und Witsch had none of his works in stock. Suhrkamp did eventually manage to get hold of two paperbacks, *Signs in the Dark* and *Misled Thinking*, Milosz' most important work.

The book trade magazine, *Buchreport*, wrote that the German translation rights which Suhrkamp had bought from Kiepenheuer und Witsch were due to expire at the end of the year and that Suhrkamp had to pay a "considerable sum" to retain these rights.

Buchreport added that only a few days ago these rights would probably have been a good deal cheaper.

Booksellers seemed to be staying away from this year's fair. In past years they appeared in numbers to place new orders for the Christmas sales.

Why was this? Poor sales, the foul weather, or because they just did not feel like it. A poll by the Frankfurter Neue Presse confirmed that booksellers are in a lugubrious mood this year.

It seems that many of the booksellers were determined to spoil the book fair for their customers too. They said the fair was too big and too complicated and that customers would be better advised to go along to their local bookshops.

Fair deciers ought to note what Helmut Heissenbüttel wrote in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*: "Book fairs are like supermarkets. I've got no time for so-called corner shops where someone whose tastes I do not share tries to give me the hard sell. I would rather have the sterility of the pre-packed. Supermarkets not only stimulate me to buy, however devious their methods, but also to eat. And this is the effect book fairs have on me."

This is it. One does not need to look at every new title but the fair gives one ideas for one's own reading, for gifts. And this of course benefits the book sellers. Of course it is easier to serve someone who simply wants the latest best seller. But these customers do not go along to the book fair.

If someone takes the time to look over the largest book exhibition in the world then one should not condescendingly discourage him. After all, he goes to the book seller when he want to buy.

There were few spectacular sales of rights at this year's fair. Nonetheless there was widespread satisfaction. "It is a relaxed fair. One can work well here", seemed to be the general verdict. And work here means negotiations about rights. The publishers are smiling. And publishers do not smile without good reason.

There were brisk sales of rights to book clubs and paperback publishers. Here, competition is hotting up. Egon Flörchinger came to last year's fair with several million marks behind him with which to buy titles for the Moewig Verlag series.

Another example. Ephraim Kison's extraordinary success on the German market has made foreign publishers prick up their ears. Kishon was at this year's fair, too, but spent little time at his German publisher's stand. Most of the time he was in the International hall.

English, French, Japanese and Balkan publishers are interested in his And Kishon has not only ke standards but also his translation like a good author and shrewd nessman. He'll be laughing all the to the bank.

Perhaps Kishon could do business where, at the Jerusalem book fa instance. But it is easier at Frank is a known fact, for instance, that cent of all literary translation rig negotiated at the Frankfurt fair.

This is itself enough to ensure house year after year. Everyone because everyone comes. Including small publishers. Not only Kunz also Knaus. Then there are the Residenz, Wagenbach, Stiehm and binson.

The Frankfurt Robinson Verlag difficulties. One of its main backe pulled out and asked for its money so it is looking for new backers the Verlag die? Perhaps not, the the fair. Its calls for help were he a number of potential rescuers.

One well-known publisher which been struggling for some time has to the wall and did not exhibit this the Heimeran Verlag. Part of its gramme is being taken over by other publishers, Hanser and Artemis is said that Ernst Heimeran's ch inherited their father's company his will to see it survive.

Erich Fried wrote that there were many people at the fair, too much and loss, pose, and convention.

But this is all part of the fair place for wheeling and dealing year's fair, from 14 to 19 Octo be no different.

And when it is all over there for what there is no time for during fair: reading. Great though the Frankfurt Book Fair has become, it would be thinkable if there were not a the goods sold here.

Walter Benjamin has described fascination of reading well:

"The child has his hands over ears; his book is on the table, which too high, and his hand is still on page. He can still read the adventures the hero in the whirl of the letters figures and messages in the drifting flakes.

"His breath is in the air of events he can feel the breath of the chara He is far closer to the characters the adult. He is incredibly involved the actions and the words and when stands up he is snowed over by has read."

There would be no fair without publishers and the book sellers without this child.

Eberh... Sey...

(Frankfurter Neue Presse, ... October ...)

(Cartoon: Hans Georg ...)

Politically prominent black authors have best chance

Exactly 10.3 per cent of the 62,082 books published in West Germany last year were translations.

And of those over 6,000 translated titles, at most a dozen were from Black African languages.

The West German booksellers' association recently published a catalogue of works by Black African authors and works on Africa. The results are meagre and sobering. They could only muster 150 titles. Is the black continent still a big white space on the map for the West German reading public?

We always hear of the fascination of Africa when publishers are launching illustrated volumes on primitive African tribes.

But German-language publishers seem shy of publishing novels, short stories, poems or songs by African authors.

It seems that only collections of fairy tales on the one hand and works by politically prominent black Africans on the other — Leopold Sedar Senghor for example — have any chance.

The number of publishers of works on Africa is small: Peter Hammer, Diedrichs, Erdmann, Walter, Otto Lembeck and Qumran. Few other publishers seem prepared to commit themselves to long-term work on Africa. What they are trying to do is pioneering work. It is a hard road, sales hits are the exception. Why is this?

The 320 African book publishers have about 2,500 titles in stock and their total production is still under 20,000 — fewer than appear in one West German season.

And 80 per cent of these titles are school and university text books.

There are countries in Africa where it has been impossible to buy printed novels for two generations. Is that the reason for the long neglect of African literature? Or is it because the potential German book buyer has difficulties with the names of the authors: Wole Soyinka (Nigeria), Kyi Kwei Armah (Ghana), Ngugi wa Thiong'o (Kenya), Sembène Ousmane (Senegal), Modikwe Dikobe Northern Transvaal), Nkem Nwankwo (Nigeria) and Solomon Mitswairo (Zimbabwe).

These authors may be the Walsers, Bölls and Simmels of their countries, but the barriers which central European book sellers have to face are there.

Information about book sales in Africa itself is thin on the ground. Okot p'Bitik's Lavinos *Song*, originally written in Swahili, is said to have sold 50,000 copies. It is published in German by Erdmann.

One of the pioneers of African litera-

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THE PERFORMING ARTS

Offenbach's 'Tales of Hoffmann' offer a production challenge

DIE WELT

The number one hit of this opera season is Offenbach's *Tales of Hoffmann*.

Salzburg put it on this summer, Zurich opened its opera season with it and on 5 October, election day and the 100th anniversary of the composer's death, Cologne presented a new version of it with Placido Domingo as Hoffmann and Edda Moser playing the four female roles.

In Cologne the *Tales of Hoffmann* performed in the original French. Despite the eminence of the lead singers, *Tales* is not a work in which connoisseurs primarily relish the quality of singing. The greatest interest is always in the production itself. This is because there are so many different versions of the work. There is no definitive original.

At least four other people have had a hand in it. Anyone wishing to produce Hoffmann must first solve a huge puzz-

This is what Cologne director Michael Hampe has done, with astonishing, indeed sensational success. He took the original play by Jules Barbier and Michael Carré and taking this as a basis he added the musical material as edited by Frith Oeser.

The result: Hoffmann's tales have at last become a convincing, self-contained, dramatically exciting opera. And far more lyrical, gentle and moving.

The quality of Hampe's version is evident when we compare it with the Zurich version by Hans Neugebauer. Neugebauer was content to serve up the fimiliar pot-pourri, the tradition version, which allows little scope for subtlety and can only be performed convincingly using a surrealistic method in which anything goes.

Chèreau and Horres produced a brilliant version using this technique some years ago.

But Neugebauer's version is not up to the same standard.

Hampe in Cologne, assisted by stage and costume designer Martin Rupprecht and light designer Hans Toelstede, makes it impressively clear that the three acts of the opera are really tales, fantasies of Hoffmann.

More than that: Olympia, Antonia and Giulietta are not past loves of Hoffmann but idealisations of his one and only love: Stella, the singer.

Her rival is the muse — and she plots and schemes so that in the end Hoffmann is hers. The finale shows Hoffmann sitting at his desk. He has become a poet — a conclusion so refined and subtle — musically too — that it left the audience almost perplexed.

Musical refinement was needed

Conductor John Pritchard showed little subtlety or musical refinement. This four-hour production dragged on a little at times, mainly because of the absence of an in spring, dynamic conductor.

That the production did not suffer too severely as a result was thanks to Hampe's direction, in which every singer, every member of the choir, knew exactly what he was doing and why. It could have been directed by Noelte ...

Domingo is always very good, even though he was not at this best and though Hoffmann is not his strongest point.

More impressive was Edda Moser, whether one likes her voice or not. Singing and acting were one in her thousand-facetted performance.

Moser was undoubtedly the star of the show. Tom Krause, in the four baritone parts, sounded strangely narrow. Michael Sénéchal convinced as the cunning, superior servant.

Ann Murray as the muse and Niklaus was excellent. And the performances in the minor parts were also brilliant.

All Zurich could offer in comparison was Alfredo Kraus as Hoffmann. He is and remains the most cultivated of tenors. Belcanto pilgrims might be prepared to miss the entire Cologne performance for one of his arias.

Reinhard Beuth

(Die Welt, 7 October 1980)

Continued from page 10

...re in Germany is undoubtedly the Eugen Diedrichs Verlag, which has been publishing works on Africa since 1917. One of its standard titles was Leo Frobenius' 12-volume *Sammlung Atlantis*, which appeared from 1921 to 1926.

One of the Janheinz Jahn Verlag's most successful titles is *Muntu — Umrisse einer neoafrikanischen Literatur*.

As for the Diedrichs Verlag's collection of fairy tales, it takes about five years to sell an edition of five thousand.

According to publishers' reader Dr Gernot Giertz the Erdmann Verlag's books on Africa do not sell any faster than this. They have about two dozen titles in stock. Among the most successful are the East Africa and West Africa collections of short stories; 2,000 have been sold in two years.

The Peter Hammer Verlag and the Walter Verlag have collaborated on a series of 16 novels entitled *Dialogue Africa*. Also taking part in this project are the Institute for Social Economy and and Bread For Brothers' Campaign — and all book buyers prepared to sign so-called share-notes costing from DM250 upwards.

It remains to be seen whether this method can increase the target group. Lembeck Verlag director Helmut Nöreberg is generally optimistic: "There is room for expansion here." He reckons there is a hard core of about 500 interested in African fiction. The total target group — he estimates at around 3,000, which is the number of copies printed in their first editions.

Publishers hope that the day will come when it will be fashionable to read African literature. That day is a long way off.

Maybe the Suhrkamp Verlag can make a breakthrough. It plans to publish *The Africa of the Africans — African Culture and Society* and *African Short Stories* in its new edition Suhrkamp series.

W. Christian Schmitt

(Handelsblatt, 10 October 1980)

Cologne marks death of 'genius of musical buffoonery'

Frankfurter Neue Presse

When the *Tales of Hoffmann* had its premiere in Paris in 1881, its composer, Jacques Offenbach, had already been dead for five months.

He fell victim to gout on 5 October, 1880.

Offenbach' birthplace, Cologne, is going to some lengths to mark the 100th anniversary of his death.

However, it was not in Cologne but in French society that the greatest appeal to his catchy melodies and crazy stage ideas could be found.


Karl Kraus once said that in Offenbach's operettas, life seems as improbable and nonsensical, as weird and as grotesque as it is in reality.

This was particularly true of France in Offenbach's time. His work was not only an image of the cynical French upper classes during the Second Empire, unconcerned about political repression and wrong policies. Offenbach's operettas are a biting persiflage of this society.

His mockery of so-called classical culture shook belief in establish authority without rejecting it in principle. This explains why the same regime which ruthlessly prosecuted writers such as Baudelaire and Flaubert tolerated Offenbach's cheeky satires, his mockery of Napoleon III's authoritarian regime.

Offenbach was born in Cologne on 20 June 1819 and brought up in the strict tradition of the Torah by his father, a cantor. When his father saw his son had talent, he sent him to study in Paris. Then came a number of hard years for young Jakob.

His big chance came at the Paris World Exhibition in 1855. On his way to the exhibition, Offenbach passed a



Jacques Offenbach (Photo: dpa)

dilapidated theatre. He bought the licence to run it.

Theatre director, composer and conductor all rolled into one, Offenbach presented — against the advice of worried friends — an aggressive beggars' parody entitled *Les deux aveugles*.

This made Offenbach' name as a genius of musical buffoonery. Three years later his *Orpheus in the Underworld* was a *succès fou* and ran for eight months.

The critics were appalled at Offenbach's mockery of classical antiquity but the audience were delighted at the snoring gods, their revolt to the tune of the Marseillaise and the Jupiter-Napoleon chasing every woman in sight.

These hurrahs from the abyss were just what Paris wanted and Offenbach was only too pleased to oblige.

But these tremendous stage successes did not completely plug the hole in Offenbach's finances. Friviolous expenditure on stage costumes, high wages to singers and his large family brought Offenbach into serious financial difficulties, from which not even an American tour could help him.

Offenbach hoped that his new opera, based on the tales of E.T.A. Hoffmann and full of fine, memorable music, would solve his problems.

But Offenbach died while this opera was being rehearsed. When, five hours later, the old comedian Leonce — who as Pluto in *Orpheus* had so often made the audience laugh — knocked at Offenbach's door, the doorman sighed. "Monsieur Offenbach is dead. He fell asleep gently, without noticing." To which Leonce replied: "He won't half be surprised when he does notice."

Christine Wischmann

(Frankfurter Neue Presse, 4 October 1980)

East Berlin's demands

Continued from page 1

mans as well as the world at large that the socialist camp stands firm is perfectly plausible.

Can Bonn thwart this attempt by the GDR to seal itself off?

Bonn's means are limited. Of course, the government here could exert pressure via the interest-free line of credit granted to the GDR in German-German trade or by refusing further assistance in electrifying the GDR railway system should East Berlin not reverse its recent exchange regulation.

But unfortunately such measures would have the very effect Bonn wants to prevent: they would hit the people of the GDR and curtail German-German contacts.

Even so, Bonn will have to take a clear stand if it is not to fall prey to extortion.

It would be too risky to wait for East Berlin to realise that its brand of socialism cannot be maintained through sealing-off measures and repression, notwithstanding the regime's fear of reforms.

This is the lesson the GDR should already have learned from Poland.

Hans Werner Kettenbach

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 15 October 1980)

■ MEDICINE

Drugs 'used too often' in mental illness

Doctors are becoming increasingly worried about the excessive use of drugs in treating mental illness.

The main criticism involves the liberal manner in which tranquilisers are prescribed.

One doctor says that this might get to the stage where the nation's health is put at risk.

The clinical use of drugs in mental treatment began in the 1950s, but it was never intended that they should be anything other than a crutch for actual therapy.

Now this auxiliary function has taken over as the principle form of treatment.

State psychiatric clinics are using a major part of their resources in examining the use of drugs in this way, says Professor H. Prokop of the Innsbruck University Psychiatric Clinic.

Doctors have a vast range of drugs available to prescribe.

Usually, it is the general practitioner who is consulted in the first instance.

All he needs to do is make out a prescription, a brief and simple method of treatment.

But, according to experts, prescriptions are made out without any clear idea of the illness or its cause.

Tranquilisers are prescribed far too often.

In an interview with the medical magazine *selecta*, Professor Hanns Hippius, a psychopharmaca (drugs used for treating mental illness) specialist, said: "If we doctors don't do justice to our responsibility regarding these drugs, I consider it quite possible that the abuse of tranquilisers will get to the point where it'll seriously jeopardise the nation's health."

Naturally, all pharmaceuticals have a great effect on man. The worst is addiction, which places the patient in a position of dangerous dependence on his doctor as well as on the drug.

The danger of addiction varies from drug to drug, but it can easily occur after less than one month of regular intake.

According to Professor Prokop and some colleagues, it takes at least 12 to 18 months before a patient can break this addiction.

Unlike with alcohol or nicotine, it is impossible to discontinue the use of a drug from one day to the next because this could be harmful.

The prevailing view is therefore that the weaning must take place gradually. This requires much patience by the patient and constant medical controls.

Another problem that is only just beginning to become obvious with some psychopharmaca is of a genetic nature.

Though this danger is not yet taken seriously, Professor Prokop points to the fact that genetic damage caused by alcoholism had also been minimised for a long time.

The suspected extent of genetic damage has not yet become obvious because many of the drugs have been in use for less than two decades.

There is yet another point that has come under fire: tranquillisers prevent the patient from dealing with conflict situations and therefore stop him from maturing.

This is particularly dangerous with young people.

At the last symposium of the Institute for Research into Preventive Medicine Professor Prokop said that it was the maturing of the personality above all that was delayed by drugs.

Moreover, Professor Hippius holds that any positive effect of psychopharmaca could act as a triggering device to use harder drugs.

This makes it obvious that — especially with young people — psychopharmaca should only help, and not be used as an alibi for non-therapy. But wherever possible drugs should not be used at all.

Another major point dealt with at the symposium was scientific research into the effects of psychopharmaca. This is made particularly difficult by a shortage of model experiments with animals. The problem lies in the fact that the results of animal experiments are very difficult to apply to humans.

Yet little reservation has been forthcoming from those engaging in such experiments. They are simply trying to prove that animal experiments have improved forecasts on the effects of these drugs on man.

Frequently, the effects on humans are exactly the opposite of those experienced with animals. This also applies to tranquilisers.

While they showed a "taming" effect on animals, tranquilisers frequently lead to aggression in humans. Crimes have even been committed under their influence.

There can no longer be any doubt that psychopharmaca are only meaningful if they are used to pave the way for a proper therapy. This is particularly true for tranquilisers.

Still, none of this explains why the use of psychopharmaca has risen so dramatically and why an annual 22 million prescriptions for tranquilisers are issued in America alone. Why are psychopharmaca, combined with alcohol, now being increasingly used in suicide attempts?

Psychopharmaca can be meaningful if used on a short time basis in genuine cases of severe behavioural disorders ... if they are used to enable the patient to find himself again, to regain his original autonomy and to learn to cope with his normal and natural fears.

Fears have always existed. But unless they entail a clear risk to life there is usually no need to treat them.

Once the use of psychopharmaca has become indispensable, they must not be used as an independent form of treatment but only to prepare the patient for the actual therapy.

Used in this way, psychopharmaca can help.

Wolf G. Dorner

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 8 October 1980)

Legal questions raised by chromosome-crime theory

Is there such a thing as a criminality chromosome, a genetic background that would stamp a man a murderer? And must the law take a more tolerant view when a crime is in fact committed?

"I did not ask to be born ... so it's up to the world to cope with me."

This has been the argument in the past of many whose cells bear the notorious second Y—chromosome.

But it has always been disputed how much actual guilt they have to bear for a criminal act, considering that they "could not help it."

Göttingen University genetics professor Gerhard Jörgensen recently sounded a more cautious note on this subject than had been customary up to now. Equality before the law makes it mandatory to judge men with a double Y-chromosome in exactly the same way as others, he told the 4th Congress of the International Academy for Crime Prevention in Bad Nauheim.

The problem group consists of genetically disadvantaged men who are more prone to violence and crime than the average.

Australian courts have repeatedly taken mitigating circumstances into account.

In France, the murderer of a prostitute was not given the harshest sentence in 1968 but was sentenced to only seven years' imprisonment because an expert had pointed out that people with a double Y-chromosome are accountable for their actions though they cannot be held 100 per cent responsible.

Chromosomes are the carriers of genetic information in the cells. The child inherits 23 chromosomes each from the father and the mother. Two of the total of 46 chromosomes control the sexual development. They have been dubbed X and Y.

In the male, usually one X and one Y chromosome form a pair of sex chromosomes. Women always have two X-chromosomes.

Before the semen or ovary cells mature, the sets of chromosomes are halved because otherwise their number would double with every generation. The chromosome pairs separate and each semen or ovary cell receives 23 chromosomes.

So far as the sex chromosomes are concerned, things are very simple with women: every ovary cell receives one of the two X-chromosomes.

Not so with males. Here, either an X or a Y chromosome enters the nascent semen cells.

In the process of fertil[isation] ovary celle can be reached by [either an] X or a Y carrying semen cell.

In the former case, the ovum receives two X chromo[somes and] develops into a girl. In the latter [it] receives the combination XY [and deve]lops into a boy.

Both types of semen cells are frequent, making for a more equal distribution of the sexes.

Thus the Y-chromosome lead[s to the deve]lopment of the male sex. But if [a semen] cell happens to fertilise the ovum [with two] Y-chromosomes, a sort of [...] superman results, the chromosome [com]bination being XYY.

It is these men we are concerned [with] here. They usually grow exce[ptionally] tall and are said to tend to crime.

But this is not all. Much more [than] just a tendency to violence has [been] attributed to the two Y-chromosomes.

A particularly unpleasant skin [...] occurred in England in the 18[th and] 19th centuries. The skin of the [...] vas full of warts and sc[ales ...] those affected were called "wart[y peo]ple".

They are said to have capitali[sed on] their disease by exhibiting the[mselves] for money. But it soon turned o[ut that] the same illness could affect wo[men as] well and that the responsibility c[ould not] lie with Y-chromosomes.

But the suspicion that men [with] double Y-chromosomes are more [likely] to commit crimes seems justified.

Statistics show that XYY ty[pes are] more prevalent among criminals.

A study of mental hospitals [...] that two per cent of the male [...] are XYY types.

"It appears that — though with [de]lay — attitudes mature in the end [once] the dangerous adolescent years [have] been weathered without loss of [...] and personal integrity," says Pr[ofessor] Jörgensen.

The occasionally evident lack of [intel]ligence can be offset by a suitab[le up]bringing.

It is important to bear in mind [that] lack of control and sexual exces[s are] probably not only due to genetic [back]ground but to a combination of [...] environmental influences.

Such traits are not necessarily a[ttribut]able only to the Y-chromosome — [and] even should they be, parental [...] can do a great deal to prevent [...] males from falling prey to the [...] risk they undoubtedly run. *Theo [...]*

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 2 October [...])

Long-lasting damage to hijack victims

The psychological damage to the victims of hijackings can be permanent. Chronic depression of a severity paralleled only in former concentration camp inmates has been found in one study.

According to Professor Andreas Ploeger, of the Technical University in Aachen, many of the victims still (three years after the hijacking) wake up in terror, are afraid of the dark and panic when they meet people resembling the hijackers.

Professor Ploeger was addressing the Congress of the German Language Society for Psychopathology of Expression, held in Cologne.

He has been commissioned by the Bonn Ministry of the Interior to investigate the effects on the victims of a hijacking in 1977.

On 13 October 1977, four Palestinian terrorists hijacked a Lufthansa jetliner bound from Majorca to Frankfurt.

Eighty two passengers and four crew members were held hostage for five days while the aircraft flew via Rome, Nicosia and Aden to Mogadishu, where the hostages were freed in a commando raid by a special unit of the German border police.

Although his findings have not yet been fully evaluated, it has been established that the extreme psycho[logical] stress has made most of them ill.

Certain sounds, such as those [...] reminiscent of the public address [...] commands of the leader of the ter[rorists] lead to reactions of fear.

Partnership conflicts have be[come] more pronounced; and two couples [have] meanwhile separated.

Says Professor Ploeger: "Especially [in] such unusual situations the part[ner is] confronted with the question 'wh[o are] you?' and in most cases the answ[er is] problematic."

Some of the former passengers are burdened with feelings of guilt [and] self-recrimination — like the man [who at] times identified himself with the [...] of the skyjackers, even after Captain Schumann had been shot de[ad].

Continued on page 14

MODERN LIVING

Hang-gliding woman seeks more peaks to conquer



Wera Mertens: the higher the better.

The first women to fly a hang glider from the top of Africa's highest peak, the 6,000-metre Kilimanjaro, wants to try an even higher mountain next time.

Wera Mertens, 35, a graphic artist from Frankfurt, said that her feat, last month, is only a forerunner.

"There are so many lovely mountains, and while I still haven't got a specific one in mind, I know that the next try will be one that is even higher than Kilimanjaro," she says.

In the meantime, she is keeping fit by jogging, skiing and mountaineering.

Kilimanjaro is a volcanic Kenyan mountain that was first climbed in 1889. Its peak is snow covered all year round.

Wera Mertens went on her expedition together with the hang glider Horst Schäfer and four mountaineers.

A week earlier, the team practised on the nearby Mt. Meru which is "only" 4,565 metres.

The ascent to the snow-covered Kibo peak of Kilimanjaro took three days. The two hang gliders in the team of six carried their own apparatus: weight: 30 kilos. The rest of the equipment also had to be carried, which meant that each remaining member of the team was saddled with 25 kilos.

The ascent was an unforgettable experience. It led through tropical forest, highland bush country and glaciers.

Schäfer went off first, but crashed on take-off. He was uninjured, but his apparatus was a write-off.

Wera Mertens decided to fly alone. Due to the rarefied air at 6,000 metres, her take-off run had to be much faster than usual and she was hampered by the heavy clothing she had to wear.

Still, she got off to a good start and, after a one hour flight, landed near Mushi in Tanzania.

A small radio set enabled her to maintain contact with her teammates on top of the mountain.

The villagers of Mushi came running to her, but were scared to come close. It was not until she waved at them that they approached hesitantly, touching the flying machine.

Albert Bechtold

(Kieler Nachrichten, 10 October 1980)



The man who came in from the cold: Jaromir Wagner back on terra firma after transatlantic flight.

Man prefers flying on the outside of his aircraft

Jaromir Wagner arrived in New York in a heavy wind which he felt the force of more than most people.

This is not surprising, since at the time he was strapped to the outside of a twin-engined de Havilland Islander aircraft.

An armada of 20 helicopters with photographers and television crews greeted Wagner on the final stretch of his historic transatlantic flight during which he flew on top of the aircraft.

The only way he could communicate with the pilots, Holger Groth and Alwin Lang, was by signalling into a mirror screwed on to the front of the plane.

Having landed and taken off his crash helmet and the diver's goggles, Herr Wagner took a deep breath and ... "What a tough trip."

Then he slid to the ground wh... representatives of an aviation co... poured a bottle of champagne over ...

It took three years to prepare for ... feat. "I like taking risks and I've ... face many a challenge in my life. I ... wanted to do something nobody ... ever done before. Besides, I was ... from the very beginning that it ... work," Wagner told the ... journalists.

The whole thing was costly a... mated DM500,000. Wagner ... admits that he had taken a ... financial risk. He hopes to get ... offers from the film and advertising ... dustries — and a book is to be p... ed before Christmas.

The dramatic flight began in G... on 27 September, taking Wagner ... land, Greenland and Canada. A ... team recorded some of the flight.

Wagner spent some 50 hours ... 9,500 kilometres) strapped in a ... structure on the roof of the D... twin-engined plane.

Over Greenland, the wind blew ... stinging cold of minus 70 deg. cel...

This was the first Atlantic ... for the pilots.

Nikolaus Prei...

(Die Welt, 10 October ...)

Hijack victims

Continued from page 12

the terrorists in front of the hostage... like the woman who, having been se... mistreated by the terrorist leader, ha... one wish: to become a member ... organisation.

Sixteen of the hostages have been ... dergoing psychotherapeutic trea... for the past year.

According to Professor Ploeger, ... could have been avoided if psycho... treatment had begun immediately.

But there are also positive p... nality developments among the ... maths of Mogadishu: many of the ... tims have changed their attitude to... life and have entered into me... personal relations. They have bec... more tolerant and more ... towards their fellow man.

Annelies...

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, ... October ...)

Former chimney sweep turns to restoring weather vanes

Franz J. Burbach, of Cologne, has a lofty occupation: he restores weather vanes and church statues.

He once was a chimney sweep, but made the change several years ago after thinking about it for some time.

It all started in his home village, Niederembt, near Bergheim, when the local pastor complained that he didn't have the cash to restore the rusty weather vane on the church.

Burbach and a friend agreed to do the job. The payment: two dozen bottles of beer.

That spelled the end of chimney sweeping. Burbach went and learned about locks and keys, about carpentry and about roofing.

Then he went to Britain to start.

He returned to Germany and wrote to various clergymen, offering his services. The business started snowballing through word-of-mouth.

Since then, Herr Burbach, 39, has restored or replaced more than 40 weather vanes — mostly dismantling them and taking them to his workshop for further treatment.

He only climbs the steeples in good weather and when there is no wind.

But even in his time off, he prefers the loftier types of hobbies such as gliding, parachuting, hang gliding and ballooning. In fact, he is the founder of a private balloonists' club.

At one time, he wanted to cross the Atlantic in a balloon, but an injury forced a postponement. Eventually someone else went instead. While in England, Burbach caused a sensation with a tightrope act over the mouth of the Thames. "The whole thing started with a bet. But then it snowballed and eventually even London's bookies accepted bets on it. I had never before been on a tightrope ... but practice makes perfect." That got him into the Guinness Book of Records. Proceeds of the stunt went to handicapped children.

dpa

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 9 October 1980)

Weather-proofing for the weather vane: Franz J. Burbach at work. (Photo: dpa)

SPORT

Rally driver top of the world

There have been plenty of well-known Germans in motor racing, ...n such as Bernd Rosemeyer, Rudolf ...acciola, Karl Kling, Hermann Lang ... Count Berghe von Trips.

But none ever won world champion... ...s; none, that is, except Walter ...hrl, 33, from Regensburg, a 1.93 m (6ft ...) Bavarian who won this season's ...d rally-racing crown.

...s he emerged from his Fiat 131 ...th in San Remo, Italy, after ...5 km on the road his only comment having clinched the title was: "Well, ...made it."

He is not very talkative and not given ...temperamental outbursts either, ex... perhaps when something is wrong ...h his car.

Take, for instance, the last leg of the ... Remo rally: "Every time I shifted ...m the accelerator to the brake pedal ... differential hit the car body.

"It was a constant racket that really ... on my nerves. I couldn't have put ... with it for even another 50 kilo...tres."

This comment in many ways revealed ... constant uncertainty, his fear of ...ing to retire from the race, the anxie... that is part of Röhrl's make-up.

But, as his co-pilot Christian Geist...örfer, 27, from Munich puts it:

"When Walter is really under pressure ... the extent that he sets aside his an...ty of being forced to retire, fantastic is just not the word his driving. He is absolutely phenomenal." This is a sentiment echoed by the Scandinavians, who for years have very much ruled the car rally scene. But this season San Remo was Röhrl's fourth rally win. The others were Monte Carlo, Portugal and Argentina. And he finished a clear six-and-a-half minutes ahead of Ari Vatanen of Finland, who was driving a Ford Escort.

What made this convincing victory even more meritorious was that Röhrl's Fiat was neither prepared nor suitable for the San Remo rally. The works were on strike.

He entered the running underpowered. His engine developed only 210hp, not the 240hp envisaged, a sure sign that good driving, not just a fine car, was what counted.

Made it he certainly has as world champion, reluctant though he may be to take on stardom. After winning the Monte Carlo rally he had said:

"I just wanted to show them there is someone up here in Bavaria who can knock spots off the lot of 'em. Now I've proved my point I might just as well retire."

Bubbles all round: champion Röhrl (right) with co-driver Geistdörfer after clinching the title. (Photo: dpa)

If the choice were his, he would soonest do all his driving round the precincts of Regensburg Cathedral — on his own back door, as it were.

He is fond of peace and quiet and devoted to Bavaria and his home, yet these qualities are hard to reconcile with the 120,000 kilometres he has logged this year in training and rally racing.

"If I win the world championship," he once said, "I shall head straight for the backwoods of Bavaria, do a few exercises on the bough of a cherry tree and lie down in the meadow."

That's the way he is, quiet and thoughtful, married last year to his fiancée of nine years and a man of many sporting talents.

He was once a fine oarsman. He used to play table tennis. He is also a qualified skiing instructor. He once trained alongside Austria's Franz Klammer, who commented:

"A man with Walter's skill in motion does not acquire his skill; he is born that way."

Röhrl now faces a different kind of rally in which he will be pursued by prospective employers now he has decided not to renew his contract with Fiat.

Opel's racing manager Jochen Berger reckons any team manager who wouldn't give his eye teeth to have Walter Röhrl under contract deserves to be sacked.

Opel would certainly like to sign him. So would Audi and Mercedes. In San Remo Fiat racing manager Cesare Fiorio handed him a lengthy new contract ready for signing.

But the world champion is biding his time. He will be taking it easy in the Corsica rally, then seeing what offers have been made and coming to a decision.

Manufacturers' plans for the forthcoming season may grind to a halt. They will have to wait — until Walter Röhrl comes to a decision in his own good time.

(Die Welt, 13 October 1980)

Bundesliga ice hockey side signs Soviet player

Nikolaus Pethes, SV Hamburg's jubilant ice hockey team manager, said after signing Soviet star Alexei Mishin that people from all over Germany seemed to be ringing up to congratulate him.

At the time it would have seemed more appropriate if Bonn Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, a Hamburg man, had made the comment.

Schmidt had just been re-elected for a four-year term in Bonn and who, when all is said and done, has ever heard of Pethes (outside ice hockey, that is)?

Even his club, SV Hamburg, is better known for its Bundesliga soccer team than for its ice hockey squad. Yet the congratulations nonetheless came pouring in.

In a chilly overall political climate Pethes could pride himself on having pulled off the unlikely feat of signing West Germany's first Soviet ice hockey player.

It was no mean achievement in view of the country's boycott of the Moscow Olympics, but negotiations took a full year, and all manner of assistance was lent to back them up.

In landing what he called a unique coup Pethes was able to tread paths previously smoothed by politicians, economists and arts officials.

It was a case of the special relationship between Hamburg and the Soviet Union proving invaluable.

"Economic ties via the port of Hamburg and links between Hamburg's *Staatsoper* and Soviet cultural institutions, for instance, gained us access to the highest-ranking Ministry officials," Pethes claims.

Instead of sending the Bolshoi ballet, as it were, Russia has this time sent an ice hockey star — Mishin, 33, his wife and two-month-old daughter Elena.

Their elder daughter, aged nine, is to stay with her grandparents in Gorki, Mishin's home town, for the sake of her schooling.

He has prepared for the change. As soon as transfer terms were virtually negotiated he started brushing up his school German.

"He speaks it quite well," his Hamburg manager says. But for a former Soviet junior international it is the language of the puck that counts on the ice.

He may be "engaging, friendly and unassuming," to quote Pethes again, but he doesn't need to bargain over terms in the way North American stars do.

His Hamburg club have settled the financial details with the Foreign Ministry in Moscow. In Hamburg his finances are handled by the Soviet consulate-general, which is reportedly headed by an ice hockey fan.

Mishin, 1.87 m (6ft 1½in) and 91 kg (200lb) turned out in his first two league games for Hamburg to be a typical Soviet player.

He is neither a pack leader nor a goal-scoring ace but a player's player, a team man, disciplined and perfect in his technique with the puck.

He has much in common with many other Soviet ice hockey players with their technical and tactical perfection that have earned them the epithet "ice machines" in the West.

But: "His style of play is a sight for sore eyes and will delight the fans. Everyone who has anything do to with ice hockey in Germany can only benefit from him."

Or so says team manager Pethes, who will be accompanying his Soviet star to venues all over the country, including Hanover on 7 November.

Mishin's one-year contract is said to have cost the Hamburg club and its sponsor, a spirits manufacturer, DM40,000.

Raimund Hollo

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 7 October 1980)

Music and theat

in Germany

As early as 1882 musicians in Berlin founded a Philharmonic Orchestra, and from 1960 to 1963 the unique "Philharmonie" at the Kemperplatz in Berlin was built. 2,200 terraced seats with the podium in the centre. A place for great conductors, for great concerts. It shows that Germany has castles and palaces, cities and industry but also unusual temples of the arts. Other examples are the theatre set on a monumental flight of outdoor stairs in the medieval town of Schwäbisch-Hall; the Baroque garden theatre in Hanover-Herrenhausen; theatre in the palace of gen near Mannheim, fou 1749, and the Munich Op Bavarian National Theat 1811, burnt down later and its full splendour in 1963. grand and elegant music

National-Oper, Munich

Philharmonie, Berlin

DZT DEUTSCH FÜR TOU Beethovenstrasse 69, D-6

BUSINESS

Revival in trend of going it alone

companies are making a comeback in West Germany, according ics.
first six months of this year, ms were established.
17,000 more than in the same t year.
end contradicts opinion from es of the German political

nterview with *Der Spiegel* last ncellor Schmidt said: "What re relatively rare in Germany ters who have got some new their heads and who summon nergies to start a new business. is lacking is the dynamic en-"

on politicians had their any. Richard von Weizsäcker aid in a Bundestag budget was one of the main facts of that the Social Democrats de- premises that make entre- p meaningful."

re ill-informed. The last three , in fact, the years of new . Though there are no Krupps ns in sight who would corner tige and power within a short is nevertheless much activity scale.

show that there is a strong rds independent entrepreneur- e first half of the 1970s more panies were struck from the n were newly entered, but in rend was reversed.

people who branch out on are a different type of entre- hey are no longer the tough for the big money. Instead, them are small white-collar ick and tired of the daily There are housewives seeking in a small shop of their own. graduates who do not know with their diplomas go into

dvocates of an alternative life have latched on to the idea s profit in health foods.

y Professor Gerd Vonderach ed the new entrepreneur: "His d, his starting position and his iffer from those of previous On the one hand, he considers as economically necessary and, ther, he sees in it an attempt to ew forms of work and life.

rdingly, the new entrepreneur organisation are more experi- n reacting to new tasks and new the market."

hatever the type, they have all come to terms with business life. Results in the early stages ally not very impressive. In s not until the third year that entrepreneur starts making a Until then, he has to live on his all the more frustrating as he considerably harder than any mployee.

the new entrepreneurs, Rein- hm says: "In the first month I the clock along with my staff and arrived at 252 hours — not including the Sundays."

Böhm and his partner started the Böhm Metallveredlungs GmbH near Bonn last May.

The firm processes aluminimum window frames and originally belonged to Böhm's father. The son never intended to take it over, saying: "I always saw my father who wrecked his health working too hard . . . and this was simply too much for me."

But when Reinhard Böhm graduated from university with a diploma in economics he was faced with the frustration fo his career opprtunities. And when the father finally decided to give up the business customers were left in the lurch. So were six staff members. So Reinhard Böhm became an entrepreneur after all.

Brigitte Schöneseifen is an entirely different case. She always wanted to go into business for herself. The apprenticeship in a bank after high school graduation made her realise that, as she puts it, "I couldn't stand those blockheads for any length of time."

Working as an assistant in her father's veterinary surgery also did not appeal to her in the long run. Nor did an editorial job with a radio station.

Now aged 26, she runs a little shop in partnership with a fully trained textile saleswoman — a shop which would generally be termed a boutique. But she does not like the term and prefers to call it a women's dress shop.

Boutiques, says Frau Schöneseifen, are, together with pubs, the most risky type of business for beginners: 44 per cent in these fields fold in the first four years, says the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Siegen.

Survival chances for Reinhard Böhm and Brigitte Schöneseifen are above average because both are well trained.

Herr Böhm recognised the importance of training in the very beginning: "I must have spent 200 hours filing applications for public-sector loans. I presented the banks with detailed feasibility and cash flow studies and gathered all the information I could. As a trained economist, I was able to cope. But what about the little tradesman who wants to get on his own feet?"

The question is justified. Only 3 per cent of company founders have a university education to fall back on; and only 4 per cent are high school graduates like Brigitte Schöneseifen. Close to 60 per cent of the new entrepreneurs have only nine grades of schooling.

RETAIL TRADE
Percentage changes between 1974 and 1978
No. of outlets up
No. of outlets down
Watches & jewellery +1
Books & newspapers +5
Furniture +5
Textiles +9
Drinks +13
Radio & TV +14
Plants & flowers +14
Pharmacies +16
Ironmo +17
Electric
Music, toys, arts & crafts
Motor vehicl
Bicycles −5
Footwear −8
Tobacconists −11
Coal & fuel dealers −12
Drugstores −17
Grocers −17

Granted, textbook knowledge is no guarantee of success. Yet some theoretical knowledge is indispensable.

Among the most important problems in starting a new business are the difficulties in assessing market opportunities, problems with the authorities and the complexity of legal and fiscal regulations.

It is obvious that people with a good educational background are better equipped to cope with these.

The only still greater problem is money. More than half of the new entrepreneurs need more than DM60,000 starting capital; 20 per cent need more than DM150,000; and only 17 per cent can manage on less than DM30,000. What is lacking is private funds.

The state,—interested in enlivening competition by increasing the number of competitors, has a cornucopia of promotion funds for newcomes to business.

Bonn, for instance, uses European Relief Programme (ERP) funds to grant 10 *to 15-year credits at 7 per cent. Last year* alone these credits amounted to DM624 millions (close to twice the 1978 figure).

A capital assistance programme (also by Bonn) has been providing an additional shot in the arm since mid-1979.

The *Länder* also have a number of credit facilities for medium sized businesses. One of these is a programme supplementary to ERP credits; another by the Bank for Reconstruction provides a different type of support. And in addition both Bonn and the *Länder* provide interest subsidies for loans granted by private banks.

The entrepreneur who has not got lost in this confusing maze of programmes that either supplement or exclude each other can obtain the balance of the money needed from banks and savings banks under special loan programmes.

The flood of promotion money should, of course, not seduce the entrepreneur-to-be into believing that this money is easy to obtain.

It is usually the banks who determine who is worthy of these public sector starting aids. It is they who examine the credit applications and forward them to the various governmental or semi-governmental banks.

In cases where the investment is not guaranteed by other institutions, the banks themselves have to bear the brunt of the risk.

Reinhard Böhm: "The bankers' training in matters of imagination is restricted to depicting the possibility of failure. Ans since they are so obsessed with it, the question of collateral is always foremost in their minds. In my case, what they would have liked best was an unencumbered piece of ground. But the man going into business usually doesn't have such a thing."

Banks criticised for acting 'slowly'

Apart from being censured for not providing enough opportunity for people willing to take a risk, the banks have also come under fire for processing applications slowly.

There have been cases where it took more than six months for an entrepreneur-to-be to get a credit. In the interim, the banks are usually happy to provide their own expensive bridging facilities.

Bankers Hans Jürgen Krause is trying to pass the buck, saying: "In examining credit applications, the banks must obtain expert acvice, be it from the Chambers of Commerce and Industry or the Chambers of Trade."

But he concedes: "The applications must be made before an investment is tackled. And if time is of the essence the money frequently does come too late."

All this does not promote the entrepreneurship which the Chancellor found so sadly lacking. But despite all the red tape the state promotion programmes make sense.

One in four new businessmen questioned in recent polls said that he would not have been able to get on his own feet without public sector assistance.

Instead of complaining about the lack of entrepreneurship, our politicians would be well advised to make the state promotion facilities more efficient.

Wolfgang Gehrmann

(Die Zeit, 10 October 1980)

Continued from page 6

culation that this might happen shake the world's faith in this currency, a snowball of unprecedented size would be loosed.

Huge amounts for foreign money would be withdrawn, sending the deutschemark rate plummeting and leading to an erosion of our foreign exchange reserves and an explosion of interest rates.

Those who brush this aside as exaggerated pessimism should prick their ears to hear what foreign money circles have to say about the deutschemark. They will be surprised to hear how much of our currency's legendary reputation has been lost with dwindling appreciation prospects.

Any tampering with exchange rates will not solve but aggravate our current account problem.

The only thing really helpful would be less consumption at home and more exports. Granted, this would be an unpopular medicine because it would mean that the Germans would have to pull in their belts.

The devaluation proponents seem to think that they could escape this necessity through a lower exchange rate.

But this is as erroneous as the belief that a devaluation would provide the *Bundesbank with more scope for reduced interest rates.*

It is probably this illusion that has made many a banker an advocate of devaluation.

Claus Dertinger

(Die Welt, 15 October 1980)

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